GCN Home > April 17, 2000 issue
Poor testing doomed Mars missions, officials say
NASA stands by the faster, better, cheaper approach to project development even though space agency officials acknowledge that the overzealous application of the reinventing government tenet likely doomed three recent Mars missions.

Testimony to lawmakers, as well as independent reviews point to inadequate software testing as the chief cause of the September failure of the Mars Climate Orbiter and the December demise of the Mars Polar Lander and Deep Space 2 probe.

A lack of oversight and manpower led to the testing snafus, NASA Administrator Daniel S. Goldin, the General Accounting Offices Allen Li and Marshall Space Flight Center director Arthur G. Stephenson said. They testified last month at a hearing of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space.

NASA officials promised a top-to-bottom evaluation of the Mars program. We needed at least two people doing everything, said Carl Pilcher, science director for solar system exploration at NASA. We all recognize now that the teams were too small.

In late March, the agency named Scott Hubbard director of the Mars Program, putting an individual in charge of the area of exploration for the first time in NASA history, officials said.

Meanwhile, NASA is revisiting its plans for upcoming Mars programs. An orbiter mission scheduled for next year will continue, while a lander mission slated for next year has been put on hold.

Most of the reports stated that NASA simply went too far with its speedy, economical method of development, overlooking standard techniques and management principles in an effort to rush projects to the launch pad.

Agency officials generally stand by the approach, however. We just have to fine-tune it, said Don Savage, NASAs public affairs officer for space science.

Li, associate director of Defense acquisition issues for GAOs National Security and Internal Affairs Division, cited concerns with NASAs efforts to downsize. Studies by GAO, NASA and independent panels concluded that the existing work force is stretched thin to the point where there is just one qualified person in many critical areas, he said. NASA has identified 30 critical areas at Kennedy Space Center that do not have sufficient backup coverage.
